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PRELIMINARY REPORT ON EUROPEAN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

I would like to discuss four subjects:

First: Our objectives in Europe.

Second: The obstacles which recent events have interposed to the attainment of these objectives.

Third: The basic US strategy required to overcome these obstacles.

Fourth: Some specific tactical steps which should now be taken to carry forward this strategy.

There are further problems which need to be considered, on which I hope to present recommendations at a later time.

I. Our Objectives

I turn first to the matter of our objectives in Europe.

The most fundamental of them has always been to deny Europe to Communist control.

It was that objective, more than any other, which moved us to launch the Marshall Plan and NATO.

As these economic and military programs achieved their purposes, we conceived a second objective: to mobilize our resources in combination with Europe to serve the whole free world.

It soon became apparent, however, that this second objective could not be fulfilled without greater progress toward European unity. Only a united Europe was likely to generate the confidence, the sense of responsibility, and the resources required to project its power outside of Europe.

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European unity was also judged, from the early days of the Marshall Plan and NATO, the most effective framework within which to contain and provide a creative outlet for a West Germany which might be tempted to seek reunification with East Germany through bilateral arrangements with Moscow, or otherwise prove a disruptive element in the world power balance.

We recognized that an integrated Europe would pose dangers, if it struck off on its own, seeking to play a role independent of the US. To minimize the chances of such a split, and to ensure that the resources of a uniting Europe were used to best effect, we sought to strengthen the instruments of partnership between Europe and the US, e.g., NATO and OECD, at the same time as we promoted and encouraged the process of European integration.

The first task of my review, as I conceived it, was to estimate whether these goals of European unity and Atlantic partnership are still valid.

As to European integration: Are the reasons still sound which persuaded us that attainment of this goal was in the US interest? And is that attainment still feasible?

The US needs European resources to promote the defense, security, and trade of the free world. And it remains true that only a united Europe is likely to generate adequate resources. Individual European countries see their national contributions, at best, as being too small to be worth while; a resulting sense of futility discourages them from additional effort.

The goal of European unity thus remains in our interest. But is it feasible?

My own belief is that the process of European integration is an imperative of modern history.

We have seen the process gather strength steadily over the last fifteen years -- gather strength not only in terms of institutions and programs but, more importantly, of European attitudes.

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I believe that the process will continue to gather strength, because it is solidly grounded in both European needs and European thinking.

Europe needs unity to enhance its security, its well-being, and its sense of purpose on the world scene. These needs are recognized in the thinking of the broad mass of European peoples, for whom national symbols have lost much of their appeal, in the wake of two disastrous world wars.

A US policy which backed away from the goal of European integration because of fear that it was not feasible would be based on a misreading of the main trends at work in Europe today.

As to our second goal: that of US-European partnership: Is it still feasible and in our interest to seek a close US connection with Europe?

It is certainly in our interest.

We cannot accept the prospect of the US and Europe going their separate ways. Such a split would endanger both of our overriding postwar objectives: that of denying Europe to the Soviets, and that of mobilizing European resources for common tasks.

Moreover, no matter how deep our withdrawal, our national interest would continue to be profoundly affected by what happened in Western Europe. A fragmented or adventurist Western Europe might make all manner of trouble for us, quite aside from the danger of Communist takeover. In a nuclear age, especially, we must have a voice and play a stabilizing role in European affairs.

As to feasibility: There is, of course, considerable anti-Americanism in Europe. I shall speak shortly of its bases, and what it suggests as to our own actions. But we should recognize that this feeling is outweighed and

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overshadowed by a deeper European feeling of shared values and interests with the US. A close US-European tie is not made inevitable by this deeper feeling, but it is at least brought within our reach.

To say that it is still practical and desirable to pursue both of our operational goals -- European unity and US-European partnership -- is not to say that we should stand, without change, on the course we were following before recent events.

For it is clear that these events have created new obstacles to our pursuit of these goals. Shifts of emphasis and tactics are required to deal with such obstacles.

II. Obstacles

De Gaulle has created three obstacles to the attainment of our objectives: he has excluded Britain from the Common Market; thrown a block across the Common Market as a route to European political unity; and placed before Europe an image of intra-European and Atlantic relationships contrary to our interests and conceptions.

Playing upon the European desire for a larger voice in world affairs, he has, in fact, proposed that Europe be built around a Paris-Bonn axis which he expects to dominate, to which Italy and the other continental powers might attach themselves as satellites, and from which U.S. power and influence would be progressively withdrawn. As that withdrawal proceeds, he undoubtedly looks to an accretion of resources from Europe in support of a French Continental System, including the Force de Frappe.

In prosecuting this effort, de Gaulle has both liabilities and assets.

His liabilities include the fact that European desires for early U.S. military and political withdrawal from Europe are weak, if non-existent; and that Europe -- including West Germany -- does not show a willingness to accept de Gaulle's hegemony.

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His assets include the fact that there are strong European desires for a larger European voice in nuclear affairs, in broader military strategy, in East-West negotiations, and in political policy in regions outside the NATO area. The present predominant US role in all these fields is increasingly resented; a professed US intent to share this role with Europe, if it unites, is thought to be belied by our current actions. There is a growing fear that we may want to control a strong and united Europe by smothering it in the Atlantic Community. This resentment of our role, and distrust of our ultimate intentions, breeds anti-Americanism which de Gaulle can exploit.

It also, paradoxically enough, breeds a sense of dependence on the US which makes it more difficult to move Europe to expanded effort; and the absence of this European effort, in turn, creates a necessity for unilateral US action, which intensifies European resentment.

Thus the greatest need in framing a policy which would successfully outflank de Gaulle, and move us toward our goals, is twofold:

First: To make more clear than we have to date our willingness to treat a uniting Europe as an equal partner, provided it is prepared to assume the burdens involved.

Second: To break the deplorable interaction between present European dependence and US predominance, a consequence of which is enhanced European frustration, anti-Americanism, and unwillingness to assume enlarged responsibility in money, men, and political commitment.

III. Proposed Strategy

A strategy to this end requires that in the areas of initiative open to us -- mainly in fields where the US and European countries must act together -- we move

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forward in a demonstration that the vicious circle can be broken and a true partnership can be built. The three critical areas are:

First: the multilateral mixed manned Force, which holds real promise as a response to European aspirations for a greater nuclear role.

Second: political consultation, as it derives directly from the multilateral force, and in other respects.

Third: trade negotiations, to bring Britain closer to the Continent in a common enterprise with us.

It is essential that, while moving forward with these Atlantic actions, we also dramatize more successfully our willingness -- indeed, our desire -- to see a united Europe eventually act as an equal partner with the U.S.

To make this willingness credible, we should do two things:

First: We should support, in every way we can, the movement toward European unity. Basically, of course, progress toward unity must depend on the Europeans themselves. Still our own influence is considerable; we have put that influence to good use in support of European integration over the past ten years, and we should continue to do so. Britain must be urged to take the lead in European integration to demonstrate her sincere desire to play a part in Europe. One field for such leadership might be the proposal for creation of a European Parliament.

Second: We should leave open -- in the fields of nuclear policy and political consultation -- the possibility of arrangements in which an effectively unified Europe would play a larger role than will be possible so long as these arrangements must run between the US and separate European nations.

In nuclear policy this means making more explicit our eventual willingness to consider allowing a united Europe

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to buy out the US share in the multilateral mixed manned force. This underlines the importance of setting up the force in a way that it is so integrated, through mixed manning and other means, as to preclude national withdrawal or any national use of elements of the force.

In political consultation, this means making clear our willingness eventually to replace a five or six member NATO Executive Committee with a two member committee -- the US and Europe.

The broad strategy outlined above is designed to frustrate de Gaulle's efforts to convince the Europeans that immediate Atlantic cooperation and progress towards European unity are mutually antithetical. This is the heart of his case to Europe.

It is also designed to break the interaction, already mentioned, between European weakness and US predominance which is frustrating movement toward both European unity and Atlantic partnership.

And it is designed to maintain allied cohesion for constructive purposes in the period immediately ahead, while holding out to de Gaulle and to France the opportunity to rejoin the Western coalition on terms which would meet those of his aspirations that are most widely shared, thus permitting renewed progress toward European unity -- which cannot, in the long run, be achieved without France.

Two of these de Gaulle concerns, evident since 1958, are worth particular note: his desire to end the US nuclear monopoly, and his desire for a larger European voice in a process of political consultation extending beyond the NATO area. If, through the multilateral force and various devices of political consultation, we can demonstrate to de Gaulle that we are drawing Europe, and especially Germany, into these two areas of activity on an Atlantic basis, he will be faced with the following choices:

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1. To attempt by veto and other means to disrupt these Atlantic ventures;

2. To maintain his isolation passively, while these ventures move forward;

3. To find a dignified way to come to terms.

If he seeks to disrupt NATO, at the present stage of European dependence on U.S. military strength, he will almost certainly run into much more severe reactions in Europe, and even in France, than he faced as a result of his recent actions. We should be prepared to face such tactics with confidence.

If he remains in passive isolation, his bargaining position will become progressively weaker, to the extent that Atlantic arrangements gather momentum and prove successful. This success will depend, as indicated above, on a clear US indication that the end goal is to create a sounder basis for a partnership of equals between the US and a uniting Europe, not to blanket Europe indefinitely in wider Atlantic arrangements.

Despite de Gaulle's stubbornness and loyalty to his own vision of affairs, it is not altogether to be ruled out that, if the multilateral force succeeds in drawing Germany wholeheartedly into the nuclear business, and if the various processes of political consultation gain substance, he will decide that he should pursue his objectives within the club rather than outside.

But this will only happen if we now move vigorously to carry out the strategy outlined above, without being diverted from this course by:

-- an attempt to mount punitive or harassing action against de Gaulle, or

-- an excessive anxiety to come to terms with him before this strategy has created conditions more conducive to reasonable negotiations than those now existing.

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If this is the strategy to be followed, it is essential that all our actions -- in Washington and Europe, in both the political and economic fields, in both the State and Defense Departments, and at every level of both Departments -- be geared to this strategy. We must act with consistency of purpose, and minimize disturbing pronouncements and initiatives capable of misinterpretation. We must ensure that proposed military moves are carefully reviewed from a political standpoint before being taken. We cannot make progress toward complex objectives, in the face of major obstacles created or compounded by de Gaulle, without an effort which is as persistent and consistent, over a sustained period of time, as his own.

IV. Actions

In execution of this strategy, we need to do two things:

First, mount certain specific actions, which I will discuss here.

Second, resolve certain more basic questions on which I will make recommendations later.

I turn now to immediate actions. In discussing them, I will follow the general division indicated in the President's instruction to me:

1. Multilateral Force:

(a) We should set a target date for completion of Ambassador Merchant's negotiations with the multilateral force's initial prospective members -- Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the UK. These negotiations should seek a Preliminary Executive Agreement, which would permit training of mixed crews and other low-cost activities to begin. This date should be before the Italian elections in late April.

(b) Even before we clarify our policy toward intensified political consultation with Europe, we should begin

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regularly to demonstrate that we shall seek before the event understanding and, if possible, consensus with Europe on proposed US actions, where vital European interests are involved. We have repeatedly said this, but our actions must show that we mean to act in this fashion.

2. Foreign Economic Policy

(a) We should speed up the Trade Expansion Act negotiations, both by exploring ways to reduce time-consuming preparations on our side and reaching an understanding with the UK and the Common Market on how the negotiations will be conducted before proceeding to talk to other parties.

(b) We should not now establish a definitive U.S. position on UK "association" proposals. My present view is that the kind of "association" likely to be acceptable to France in existing circumstances would not be to the advantage of the U.S. or UK. If a serious proposal, appearing to meet genuine British economic and political needs were offered, we should consider it in the light of whether our own broad interests could be fully protected.

(c) We should re-examine recent US restrictive actions. We must seek ways to resist or accommodate the demands of domestic pressure groups in ways which do not throw excessive burdens on our European policy at this critical juncture.

3. Negotiations with the Soviets

The wisdom, at this time, of our putting forward any new proposals in regard to Berlin seems to me highly questionable -- in the absence of clear evidence of Soviet concessions on the basic issues.

We should, in whatever manner seems appropriate, manifest U.S. determination to protect the freedom of West Berlin -- if necessary, by unilateral action. At the same

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same time, we must scrupulously preserve, through consultation, the closest understanding with our interested allies.

4. Germany

(a) The President should send a letter to the Chancellor centering on this theme: the continuity of our joint commitment to a close US relationship with a uniting Europe. The letter would emphasize these specific points:

(i) U.S. determination to maintain forces in Germany as long as the threat remains.

(ii) Strong endorsement of the Merchant mission; the importance of an early Preliminary Agreement; and US willingness to remain a full participant in the multilateral force so long as this is desired by the other participants.

(iii) Reiteration of U.S. support for continuance of efforts to bring the UK fully into Europe.

(b) We should not make an attempt to prevent ratification of the Franco-German treaty. We should, on the other hand, make absolutely clear to Adenauer, his government, and Parliament that the stability of U.S.-German relations requires unambiguous German commitment, in words and deeds to: 1. NATO; 2. the multilateral force -- rather than to national or Franco-German nuclear programs; and 3. British accession to the Common Market.

Discreet support should be extended for a Bundestag Resolution to this effect, to accompany passage of the Treaty.

5. United Kingdom

(a) We should encourage the UK to exploit whatever opportunities may exist for closer ties with the Continent, and leadership in the process of European political, economic and military integration. More specifically, we should

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encourage the UK to play a substantial and active part in the multilateral mixed manned force. Such questions as the political activation of the WEU should be left for the European countries to resolve.

(b) We should quickly reach agreement with the British on the necessity for close, unobtrusive, consultation between us as they chart their course, so that we will not be faced with fait accompli.

(c) We should encourage the British to consider what unilateral adjustments they might make to bring their economy into conformity with developments in the EEC, so that if later an opportunity is presented for them to enter the Common Market, many of the former impediments will have been removed.

(d) While assuring the British of our support, we should do nothing publicly to reinforce the appearance of special ties.

(e) We should suggest that the British Government, by whatever means appear effective, do whatever it can to mitigate excessive British hostility to the Germans. In short, the British should stop being beastly to the Germans.

6. France

I recommend no immediate positive actions in regard to France. It is important that our posture be one of impeccable politeness without indulgence in recrimination or threats, while making clear the basic contrast between our goals and those of de Gaulle. No effort either to isolate France or to seek a US-French accommodation should now be made; moves toward such an accommodation would almost certainly fail at this stage, and would only demoralize the other European countries. Our tactic with France must be to provide a counter attraction, not aimed at France, but at the legitimate ambitions of Europe.

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The opportunity for France to join in these efforts must always remain open. In the meantime, we should have well-formed contingency plans against a de Gaulle assault on NATO, our trade negotiations, or our balance of payments.

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I recognize that the issues I have dealt with require much additional thought and analysis. Notably, answers are required to questions posed by the President regarding the multilateral force, especially the veto, the creation of a mechanism or mechanisms, or more thorough use of existing ones, for broad political consultation, and, in coordination with Governor Herter, the meshing of our foreign economic policy with our political objectives in Europe.

I shall shortly have recommendations on these points to present to the President.

David Bruce

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